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I.

INTRODUCTION

In their response on appeal, the Delavans acknowledge they advanced counterclaims
seeking a decree of quiet title and a declaratory judgment that the 1949 quit claim deed from John
Boothe and Gertrude Boothe to Oliver Delavan and Edna Delavan included a disputed triangular
area which encompassed a cement boat ramp and a portion of Boothe Park Road westerly of the
driveway to their property. The 1949 quitclaim deed contained a metes and bounds description.
This deed was recorded as Kootenai County Instrument Number 224726.
In its findings following the Phase II trial, the district court found, “For an unknown reason,
there was a problem with the lot numbering as shown on the Plat versus what was possessed on
the ground, resulting in Oliver Delavan possessing one hundred (100) fewer feet of lake frontage
than he possessed title to pursuant to the Plat and his deeds.” AR pp. 1-7, Finding No. 2. The
District’s expert surveyor witness, Geremy Russell, indicated it was incredibly significant that
John Boothe, one of the original platters of the property, recognized the error was a numbering
error perpetuated by those preparing deeds, and not a layout error in the plat. Tr Vol. II, p. 366,
L. 8 – p. 367, L. 13.
In their response on appeal, Gregory and Ellen postulate that the original platting parties
made an error that resulted in a northward “shift” in the lot numbers used by deeding parties to
identify Lots 19 through 38. Response Brief, p. 11. Gregory and Ellen claim it was the original
platting parties, including John Boothe, who were the source of the lot numbering error contained
in some of the transfer deeds granted in the subdivision. Id. Gregory and Ellen further claim the
trial court properly recognized Oliver and Edna expected to receive three hundred feet of water
front property when they purchased their lots from Louis Wasmer, and it was incumbent upon the
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Boothes to assure Oliver and Edna’s expectations were met in their lot purchase even though the
Boothes were not parties to the Wasmer conveyance. Response Brief, p. 13.
Since certain deeds contained improper lot descriptions, Gregory and Ellen leapt to a novel
“shifted lot” theory to determine what the Boothes intent was when they quit claimed the unplatted
parcel of property to Oliver and Edna. Gregory and Ellen solicited an expert opinion of Ernest
Warner, an Idaho licensed surveyor. Tr Vol. II, p. 243, L. 19 – p. 244, L. 16. Warner testified he
was engaged by Gregory and Ellen to express an expert opinion at trial regarding the location and
description of Lot 19 if one were to duplicate its dimensions immediately north of Lot 19 as platted
in the Lakeshore Addition to Sunnyside subdivision. Tr Vol. II, p. 259, Ll. 210-25. To illustrate
the “shifted lot” location, Warner created trial exhibits FFFF and GGGG. Tr Vol. II, p. 260, Ll.
1-11.1 These exhibits used the lot dimensions of Lot 19 as platted and replicated them immediately
north of Lot 19 as platted, and disregarded the metes and bounds description of the 1949 quitclaim
deed from the Boothes to the Delavans. Tr Vol. II, p. 263, Ll. 19-25. Warner acknowledged in
rendering his “shifted lot” expert opinion that there were no missing lots in the plat. Tr Vol. II, p.
287, Ll. 5-13.
Warner agreed in cross examination that the purpose of deed interpretation is to ascertain
the intent of the parties premised upon the language of the deed and give as much credence to the
metes and bounds calls contained in the deed as possible. Tr Vol. II, p. 276, Ll. 1-4. Of equal
importance, Warner agreed John Boothe, one of the original platting parties, deeded Lots 32 and
33 in 1940 according to the plat to a party named Fechner and specifically noted in the Fechner
deed that the lots were incorrectly designated on an official highway map as Lots 33 and 34. Tr
Vol. II, p. 289, L. 7 – 291, L. 20. Warner conceded that the source of Boothe’s awareness of a
The District objected to the foundation for trial Exhibits FFFF and GGGG because they were not retracement
surveys of the metes and bounds descriptions of the for the exhibits because
1
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numbering problem was an unofficial highway map which was not a layout error by the original
surveyor. Tr Vol. II, p. 301, L. 15 – p. 304, L. 5.
Geremy Russell, the District’s expert surveyor, testified at trial that Lots 19 through 38
were laid out on the ground as depicted on the plat based upon his survey field work which included
identifying and tying all the monuments on the ground as wells as review of all prior surveys. Tr
Vol. II, p. 93, Ll. 11-23; p. 355, L. 13 – p. 357, L. 12. Warner provided no testimony that the lots
as platted in the subdivision did not exist. Rather, he claimed there should have been an extra lot
north of Lot 19 based upon the lot numbering errors mistakes by some grantors in their conveyance
deeds to grantees.
In cross-examination regarding his “shifted lot” expert opinion, Warner agreed that deed
drafting mistakes are made at times. Tr Vol. II, p. 299, L. 20 – p. 300, L. 9. Warner agreed that
the use of an incorrect lot number in such circumstances does not amend a plat. Tr Vol. II, p. 301,
ll. 3-14. Warner acknowledged the deed from the Boothes to Oliver and Beverly was nine years
after the Boothes’ deed to Fechner, indicating John Boothe was aware of a highway map which
contained incorrect lot numbers on it when executing the quit claim deed containing a metes and
bounds description to Oliver and Edna. R p. 292, L. 12 – 293, L. 1. Warner agreed in crossexamination that the metes and bounds description used by the Boothes was not the same
configuration of Lot 19 as platted. Id. When asked to interpret the actual language of the metes
and bounds description, Warner acknowledged it encompassed the property south of the 1949
existing county road, and did not replicate a “shifted lot”. Tr Vol. II, p. 31, L. 4 – p. 312, L. 5.
Thus, Warner’s expert opinion regarding the “shifted lot” was of no value to the trial court in
determining the property deeded from the Boothes to Oliver and Edna because “[a] resurvey not
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shown to have been based upon the original survey is inconclusive in determining boundaries.”
Nutterville v. McLam, 87 Idaho 377, 381, 393 P.2d 598 (1964).
II.
A.

ARGUMENT

The district court failed to address a gap in the chain of title

Gregory and Ellen brought a counterclaim against the District for quiet title. A plaintiff
seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the strength of his or her own interest and
may not merely rely upon the weakness of his or her adversary’s interest. Eagle Equity Fund, LLC
v. TitleOne Corp., 161 Idaho 355, 362, 386 P.3d 496, 503 (2016). The evidence presented at trial
did not establish Gregory and Ellen were successors in interest to the property deeded from the
Boothes to Oliver and Edna.
In response to this argument on appeal, Gregory and Ellen claim the District alleged in its
complaint that Gregory and Ellen owned the property deeded from John Boothe and Gertrude
Boothe to Oliver and Beverly by quitclaim deed recorded as Instrument No. 292547, so it is
inappropriate for the District to raise the gap in ownership on appeal. In support of this argument,
they cite paragraph 2 of the District’s complaint (alleging Gregory and Ellen resided in Kootenai
County); paragraph 11 (alleging a dispute has arisen between Gregory and Ellen and the District
regarding the use and ownership of Boothe Park Road); paragraph 18 (alleging Gregory and
Ellen’s predecessors in title fenced their property at the line agreed by the parties to be the property
boundary between the portion retained by the Boothes and the portion granted by the Boothes to
Oliver and Beverly ) and paragraph 22 (alleging Oliver and Beverly’s successors in interest
recognized the fence line as a boundary). R pp. 14-16. An allegation in a complaint does not
establish a fact at trial unless it is admitted by the answering party.
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In their answer to the District’s complaint, Gregory and Ellen admitted paragraph 2
(establishing they resided in Kootenai County), in answer to paragraph 11 they only admitted the
existence of a dispute between them and the District; they denied paragraph 18 (that the fence was
erected on the boundary) and they did not admit nor deny paragraph 22 (that the fence was
recognized as a boundary). R pp. 19-21. Therefore, Gregory and Ellen’s ownership of the property
deeded in 1949 from the Boothes to Oliver and Beverly was not an admitted fact.
More importantly, in ¶ 5 of their counterclaim, Gregory and Ellen alleged in the first
sentence that O.E. Delavan acquired additional property through a quitclaim deed recorded in
Kootenai County Instrument No. 224726. The second sentence alleged Gregory and Ellen were
the successors-in-interest to the interest of O. E. Delavan in the quitclaim deed recorded August
17, 1949 as Instrument No. 224726. R p. 23. In paragraph 14, Gregory and Ellen alleged they
were entitled to a decree of quiet title to the property described in Kootenai County Instrument No.
224726, free of any claim, interest, or right of the District. R p. 25.
In the District’s answer to the counterclaim, it admitted the first sentence of ¶ 5 of the
counterclaim (alleging O. E. Delavan acquired additional property through a quitclaim deed
recorded in Kootenai County Instrument No. 224726). R p. 28. The District denied the second
sentence of ¶ 5 because it was without sufficient knowledge to admit or deny that Gregory and
Ellen were successors-in-interest under the quitclaim deed. Therefore, Gregory and Ellen carried
the burden at trial of proving this allegation.
Gregory and Ellen contend that the District raised the issue of their ownership of the
property granted from the Boothes to Oliver and Edna for the first time on appeal. This argument
is not true. The District presented a chain of title to the district court regarding this property
through a series of deeds starting with Instrument No. 224726 and including subsequent transfer
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deeds. See Trial Exhibits 3, 15, 16, 19, and 20. Similarly, Gregory and Ellen presented a chain of
title to the district court regarding this property through a series of deeds. See Trial Exhibits F, G,
H, I and J. The chain of title evidence presented by both parties indicate there is a gap in the chain
of title because no evidence was presented that the property deeded in 1949 from the Boothes to
Oliver and Edna was passed directly by Oliver and Edna, or through the estates of Oliver and Edna,
to Jack and Beverly. The chain of title evidence was presented at trial and is not raised for the first
time on appeal.
Gregory and Ellen claim their title in the property based upon deeds from Jack and Beverly.
Since the evidence at trial established that Jack and Beverly never obtained title to the property
deeded from the Boothes to Oliver and Edna, Jack and Beverly had no title to deed to Gregory and
Ellen. Gregory and Ellen claim Gregory’s testimony at trial cures this documentary gap in the
chain of title because he testified that Jack and his brother Frank were the heirs to Oliver’s estate.
Gregory’s testimony indicated that Edna was Oliver’s heir, and she died shortly after he did, and
Jack and Frank were Oliver’s heirs. Tr Vol. I, p. 493, l. 21 – p. 494, l. 22. Gregory was also
allowed to testify, despite objection, that he understood the estate contained three 100-foot lots.
Id.

However, no evidence was presented to the trial court that substantiated Gregory’s

understandings, or demonstrated that the property encompassed in the 1949 quit claim deed from
the Boothes to Oliver and Edna was transferred to Jack and Beverly while Oliver and Edna were
alive, or after they passed through their estates.
It was Gregory and Ellen’s burden on their counterclaim to establish they had title to the
real property to which they sought quiet title. The evidence submitted at trial by both parties
regarding this element demonstrated a gap in the chain of title. Therefore, Gregory and Ellen failed
to meet their burden of proof at trial of establishing they were the successors-in-interest to the
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property described in the 1949 quit claim deed from the Boothes to Oliver and Edna as alleged in
their complaint, and the district court erred in granting them a decree of quiet title.
B.

The district court erred in its interpretation of the 1949 Boothe deed
1.

The deed was not latently ambiguous

The quit claim deed from the Boothes to Oliver and Edna conveyed a parcel of property:
Commencing at the Northwest corner of Lot 19, as originally platted, Lakeshore
addition to Sunnyside, section, [sic] 33, Twp 50 North, Range 3 W B M thence
North 79°58’ East to the West boundary of the existing county road; thence
along the existing right of way line of said county road to its intersection with
the meander line of Lake Coeurd’Alene [sic]; thence Southerly along the
meander line of said Lake Coeur d’Alene, to the [sic] point of beginning, said land
being in the county of Kootenai, State of Idaho. (Emphasis added.)
Trial Exhibit 3.
Accordingly, the express language of the quit claim deed identified a boundary along an existing
county road to its intersection with the meander line of Lake Coeur d’Alene.
Despite the express deed language calling to a monument and its intersection with the lake,
the district court found that Boothe Park Road as it existed in 1949 did not intersect with the
meander line of Lake Coeur d’Alene because it did not continue past Oliver Delavan’s driveway.
AR pp. 1-6, Finding No. 8. The district court also found the precise course of the road near its
terminus as it existed in 1949 was indeterminable. Id. at Finding No. 9. The district court found
that in 1949, there was no boat ramp in existence at the end of Boothe Park Road, and thus no
reason for the county road to continue to the Lake. Id. at Finding No. 10. The district court further
found in 1949, Boothe still owned the unplatted property north of Lot 19 as platted as private
property with no public road at the location other than Boothe Park Road as dedicated on the plat
and/or as built. Id. at Finding No. 11. The district court found the course of Boothe Park Road as
it enters the park is substantially similar today as to its course in 1949. Id. at Finding No. 21.

7

However, the district court found the course of Boothe Park Road in 1949 beyond the entry of
what later became the park was indeterminable because the park parking lot, boat ramp, and
improvement to the road have occurred since 1955 [sic]. Id. at Finding No. 22. Based upon these
findings, the district court concluded as a matter of law, “Because the location of Boothe Park
Road in 1949 after it enters the area of Boothe Park is indeterminable, the deed from Boothe to
Delavan in 1949 in latently ambiguous.” Id, Conclusion of Law No. 5.
In Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 404, 195 P.3d 1212, 1217 (2008), this Court held:
“In interpreting and construing deeds of conveyance, the primary goal is to seek
and give effect to the real intention of the parties.” Benninger v. Derifield, 142
Idaho 486, 489, 129 P.3d 1235, 1238 (2006). When an instrument conveying land
is unambiguous, the intention of the parties can be settled as a matter of law using
the plain language of the document. Read v. Harvey, 141 Idaho 497, 499, 112 P.3d
785, 787 (2005). However, if the language of the deed is ambiguous, ascertaining
the parties' intent is a question of fact and may therefore only be settled by a trier
of fact. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 508, 65 P.3d 525, 530 (2003).
“Ambiguity may be found where the language of the deed is subject to conflicting
interpretations.” Read, 141 Idaho at 499, 112 P.3d at 787. The trier of fact must
then determine the intent of the parties according to the language of the conveyance
and the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Neider, 138 Idaho at 508, 65
P.3d at 530.
The initial inquiry into whether a legal instrument is ambiguous presents a legal question,
over which this Court exercises free review. Chubbuck v. City of Pocatello, 127 Idaho 198, 201,
899 P.2d 411, 414 (1995).
Gregory and Ellen agree with the District that “physical features existing on the ground
and referred to in the deed must be considered when construing that deed.” Akers v. D. L. White
Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 299-300, 1297 P.3d 196, 202-203 (2005). However, Gregory
and Ellen contend pursuant to 11 C.J.S. Boundaries, § 21 that it was appropriate for the trial court
to look beyond the deed to evaluate the intent of the drafter because the monument referenced in
the deed (i.e. the 1949 existing county road to its intersection with the lake meander) was missing.
Gregory and Ellen contend this Court should affirm the district court for several reasons.
8

First, Gregory and Ellen claim the district court was correct that there was a latent
ambiguity in the 1949 quit claim deed because the District presented no evidence at trial regarding
the location of the existing county when the quit claim deed was executed and delivered by Boothe
in August 1949. Gregory and Ellen claim without evidence of the location of Boothe Park Road
as it existed in August 1949, the district court did not err in concluding that the quit claim deed
was latently ambiguous.
Contrary to the claims of Gregory and Ellen, the District offered direct evidence at trial
regarding the location of the county road in 1949. Marilyn Moore testified at trial regarding her
personal knowledge of the existing county road in the years prior to 1949 through the year of 2015.
Moore is the granddaughter of John Boothe and Gertrude Boothe. Tr Vol. II, p. 377, Ll. 17-20.
Moore was

Tr Vol. II, p. 376, Ll. 17-25. Moore’s parents had a cabin on the bench

just above Boothe Park (which was eradicated due to the most recent highway construction through
the area where the cabin was located.) Tr Vol. II, p. 378, Ll. 1-13. Moore visited the Boothes’
property where the park now exists beginning when she was a preschooler. Tr Vol. II, p. 378, L.
14 – p. 379 L. 6. She guessed she visited it at least 30 to 40 times between the time she was a
preschooler until she was 20. Tr Vol. II, p. 379, Ll. 7-11. Regarding the location of the road in
the era of 1949, Moore testified:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Yes. How do you recall that road in the era of about 1949?
As it is today.
And when you say as it is today?
Well, as it is to the last time I saw it, I guess, would be more
appropriate for my statement.
So when you’re talking about the road, as it exists today, are you
talking about Boothe Park Road to the boat launch?
Yes.

Tr Vol. II, p. 381, L. 11-24
Q.

In addition to this rustic road, though, was there a county road that
9

A.

pretty much exists where the road exists today?
Absolutely.

Tr. Vol. II, p. 383, ll. 15-18.
In testifying regarding what she meant by “as it exists today”, Moore clarified she had most
recently visited Boothe Park in the fall before the first phase of the trial in this matter (which was
held November 2015). Tr Vol. II, p. 379, Ll. 14-25. Given Moore’s explicit testimony at trial, it
was error for the trial court to conclude that the deed was latently ambiguous.
The Delavans claim the only witness at trial with personal knowledge of the location of the
road in 1949 was Jack Delavan. This simply is not true. Like the district court, the Delavans
choose to entirely ignore the direct testimony of Moore.
Gregory and Ellen contend this Court upon review of certain portions of Jack’s testimony
will find support for the proposition that there was no existing county road in 1949. If that were
true, one must question why John Boothe would reference it in a deed.
Further, Jack’s testimony was not as unequivocal regarding the location of the county road
in 1949 as suggested by Gregory and Ellen. Gregory and Ellen cite to Trial Exhibit EEEE (Jack’s
deposition transcript) pages 56, 58 (found at AR-22 and 23) to support this argument. In this
portion of his testimony, Jack Delavan denied there was an existing county on the day of his
deposition, testifying as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

When was the segment of the road that comes down to the launch
put in?
It never was put in.
So there’s not a road there today that I drove on?
Well, you drove over the corner of the park, is what you did.

AR-22, Trial Exhibit EEEE, Jack Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 55, Ll. 14-20.
Q.

Okay. Let’s use that definition. Let’s use the definition that traffic
– public traffic using it makes it a road. How long has the public
been going down to that launch site to where the ramp was put in?
10

[Objection by Mr. Magnuson]
A.
I don’t know as I can answer that. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at p. 57, Ll. 3-11.
Further, Jack testified before the construction of the concrete boat ramp that there was an
area in the same location where the concrete boat ramp was later constructed which was used by
the public to launch boats, testifying as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Now, you indicated before you met Mr. Stark that there was sort of
launch there but it was dirt and rock?
It was – I wouldn’t say it was a launch. It was just a bare means of
getting to the water.
So it was a spot that people were using to launch, but it wasn’t a
developed launch?
Part of the time fishermen would go down there and put their boat
in.
Were they using a road to get down there?
Yeah. They come down off Boothe Road, Boothe Park Road, and
turned around in the park and backed down about where the ramp is
right now.
Okay. So this road that I came in on today, has that always been
there?
As long as I can remember it.
So when your dad bought it, you recall that road being there?
Yeah.

AR-19, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 43, L. 18 – p. 44, L. 11.
Bill Stark was an official with Coeur d’Alene Highway District whom Jack met in 1955 at the time
the cement boat ramp was installed by the District. AR-14, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 25, Ll. 13-21.
Consistent with Jack’s testimony, Patrick Seale, Oliver’s neighbor, testified he met Oliver
in 1982 or 1983. Tr Vol. I, p. 448, Ll. 14-17. In cross examination, Seale indicated Oliver told
him Boothe Park was a jungle when he bought his property, but there was road that went down to
the lake where he could launch boats, which Oliver characterized as a mud hole. Tr Vol. I, p. 461,
L. 1 – p. 462, L. 7. Seale also testified that Oliver told him that he allowed a few of his fishermen
friends to launch their boats there too. Id.
11

In fact, the only person who testified the road in 1949 terminated at Oliver’s driveway was
Gregory. As noted in the opening brief, although Gregory was not

the district

court allowed him to testify the county road did not extend beyond Oliver’s driveway despite the
District’s objection that Gregory had no personal knowledge concerning the location of the county
road in 1949. Yet it must be this testimony upon which the district court relied in reaching its
conclusion that the country road terminated at Oliver’s driveway in 1949. It was error for the
district court to allow this testimony at trial, let alone relying upon it in reaching its conclusion
regarding the existence and location of the road in 1949.
The Delavans also claim, based upon a snippet of an argument contained in the District’s
opening trial brief, that the District conceded South Boothe Park Road was not actually located in
a manner consistent with the road depicted on the 1910 plat. This argument misconstrues Russell’s
testimony and the District’s point in its opening brief. Russell testified as a surveyor he could not
precisely locate South Boothe Park Road from its depiction on the plat because courses and
distances were not included on the plat. The District acknowledged that in its opening trial brief.
However, it did not concede that the location of the road in 1949 was therefore indeterminable as
suggested by Gregory and Ellen.
Russell provided the expert opinion that the public road as it exists today is harmonious
with and consistent with the road as depicted on the plat. Tr Vol. I, p. 386, L. 17 – p. 387, L. 24;
Tr Vol. II, p. 149, Ll. 4-13; p. 173, Ll. 1—10; Exhibit AAA. Russell also testified he found no
evidence in his extensive research that the public road existed in a different location in 1949 than
where it existed as of the date of trial. Tr Vol. II, p. 116, L. 22- p. 117, L. 21. Gregory and Ellen’s
surveyor, Warner agreed with Russell that the public road as it exists today is similar to the plat
depiction. Tr Vol. II, p. 337, Ll. 21-24. Russell testified based upon the plat itself, the aerial

12

evidence he reviewed, the surveys he reviewed, the overlay of the road prepared by Warner, the
Kindler survey and physical features it showed at the time of the survey in 1956, that the best
evidence of the location of the road when the Boothes delivered the quit claim deed in 1949 to
Oliver and Edna is the road as it exists today. Tr Vol. II, p. 116, l. 22 – p. 117, l. 21. Russell
testified the facts and data supporting for this expert opinion was an exhaustive search of records,
photographs and anything he could find from the 1949 era, none of which indicated Boothe Park
Road existed in a different location in 1949 than it exists today. Id.
Despite the agreement between the experts for both parties that the road as it exists today
is consistent with the 1910 plat depiction, Gregory and Ellen claim it is particularly instructive to
this Court that Boothe Park Road was depicted on the plat as terminating just short of the shoreline,
while all the remaining roads depicted in the plat terminated at the outer boundaries of the plat.
There is nothing particularly instructive about this fact.
All the roads in the plat terminated at points which provide access to items adjacent to, but
outside, the plat. Most the roads terminated at the boundary of the plat and provided continuity of
access to adjacent lands. The county road dedicated to the shores of Lake Coeur d’Alene provided
access to the adjacent lake. It is clear the persons platting the subdivision desired to provide the
public access to areas outside the plat, including the waters of the lake.
Given the above evidence in the record, certain of the district court’s findings of fact are
not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Finding No. 8 that Boothe Park Road as it
existed in 1949 did not reach the meander line of Lake Coeur d’Alene because it did not continue
past Oliver Delavan’s driveway erroneously relies upon Gregory’s testimony, which lacks
foundation. Under Rule 402, I.R.E., this Court should disregard this evidence and hold the trial
court’s Finding No. 8 it is not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Further, the trial
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court disregarded the specific deed language which indicated the county road did exist and
intersected the meander line of the lake at the time the quit claim deed was granted in 1949.
Finding No. 10 that there was no reason for the road to extend to the lake before
construction of the cement boat ramp is not supported by the evidence at trial given Seale’s and
Jack’s testimony that fishermen launched their boats into the lake at the same location where the
current cement boat ramp was constructed, and they reached that launch area by use of the public
road. This finding is also contrary to Moore’s direct testimony that in 1949 South Boothe Park
Road extended to the lake in the same location as it extended to the lake in 2015 when she last
visited the park. Thus, this finding is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Finding No. 11 concluding that in 1949 that there was no public road other than Boothe
Park Road as dedicated on the plat or as built does not lend support to the conclusion that the
Boothes’ deed to Oliver and Edna was latently ambiguous.
Finding No. 22 that improvements to the park and road since 1955 have made the location
of the road in 1949 indeterminable is not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Both
expert surveyors agree the road as it exists today is consistent with the 1910 plat. Jack and Seale
both testified there was a launch area in the same location as the cement boat ramp and a road
leading to this unimproved launch before the 1955 installation of the cement boat ramp. Moore
testified South Boothe Park Road as it existed in 2015 was concomitant with its location in 1949.
For the same reasons set forth in the previous paragraph, the district court’s Finding No. 9
that the precise course of the road near its terminus as it existed in 1949 was indeterminable lacks
substantial and competent evidence to support it. Jack, Seale and Moore all place the terminus of
the road in the same location as it is today.
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Gregory and Ellen contend that conflicting evidence exists in the trial record which is
substantial and competent and contradicts the above evidence. In support of this claim, Gregory
and Ellen direct the Court to the 1956 Kindler boundary survey (Trial Exhibit 9) prepared after
installation of the cement boat ramp. Gregory and Ellen argue since this boundary survey does
not depict a road extending to the cement boat ramp (nor does it show the cement boat ramp that
was installed the previous year) that the reasonable inference would be that the existing county
road in 1949 did exist beyond the entrance to the park and did not extend to the lake. However,
the evidence is undisputed by 1956 when the boundary survey was prepared that there was a public
road to the cement boat launch. Since the 1956 Kindler survey was to document the boundary of
the park, and not interior features, it is not remarkable that the road and cement boat ramp were
excluded from the boundary survey.
Gregory and Ellen also claim Russell’s cross examination answers regarding the 1956
survey established that the 1949 road did not intersect with the meander line of the lake. This
argument mischaracterizes Russell’s testimony.
The document upon which Russell was being cross examined by Gregory and Ellen’s
counsel was not the 1956 Kindler survey. It was Boothes’ deed to Oliver and Edna. Tr Vol. I, p.
388, L. 15 – p. 391, L. 2. Russell specifically noted the deed call was to an intersection of the
existing county road with the meander line of the lake, and testified this line would intersect the
water if prolonged. Id. Russell was explaining that the meander constituted a line, and the existing
county road constituted a line, and where to two met was an intersection. Id.
Gregory and Ellen then argue since Russell explained prolongation of the line to intersect
the lake waters that it was appropriate for the district court to consider prolongation of the rightof-way line by Gregory as depicted on Exhibit DDDD to reach the conclusion that the deed was
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latently ambiguous. Exhibit DDDD was introduced to illustrate the testimony of Gregory at trial
to support his personal opinion regarding the location of the county road in 1949 even though he
was not yet born. Tr Vol. II, p. 498, L. 20 – p. 509, L. 16. It represented nothing more than an
illustration of Gregory’s argument of his personal opinion of where the existing county road
existed in 1949 based upon Gregory’s assumption that the road did not extend beyond the entry to
the park in 1949. In other words, it was not supported by substantial and competent evidence
because Gregory had no personal knowledge of the location of the existing county road in 1949.
No testimony was elicited from Gregory and Ellen’s expert survey witness, Warner, which
supported Gregory’s unsubstantiated opinion. Gregory’s unfounded opinion did not constitute
substantial and competent evidence upon which the district court could rely in deciding where the
county road existed in 1949 when the Boothe deed was delivered.
Gregory and Ellen suggest Gregory’s opinion was properly considered by the trial court
because it utilized Russell’s “suggested methodology” of prolonging lines to determine the 1949
location of the road. This is a mischaracterization of Russell’s answer regarding interpretation of
the Boothes’ deed to Oliver and Edna. Russell was answering questions posed to him in crossexamination about the intersection of the existing road right-of-way line and the meander line
referenced in the deed.
In sum, the district court was not provided substantial and competent evidence that the
1949 existing county road constituted a missing monument. As such, the district court erred as a
matter of law in concluding that the Boothes’ deed to Oliver and Edna was latently ambiguous.
2.

If the deed was latently ambiguous, the district court erred in its
interpretation of the Boothes’ intent

In a suit to quiet, the plaintiff has the affirmative of the issue and must prove his title by a
preponderance of evidence. Cell v. Drake, 61 Idaho 299, 100 P.2d 949, 954 (1940). Gregory and
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Ellen claim the Boothes intended to assure Oliver and Edna received the benefit of the bargain
they made with Wasmer when Wasmer deeded them four lots even though the Boothes were not
involved in the sales transaction. Gregory and Ellen argue this was the Boothes’ intention because
the Boothes created the lot numbering problem and they intended to correct the problems arising
from deed with incorrect lot descriptions by providing Oliver and Edna the benefit of the bargain
they made with Wasmer.
Nothing in the record supports this argument. To the contrary, the record indicates in 1940
John Boothe identified the source of the lot numbering error as originating from a highway map
that contained incorrect lot numbers. John Boothe was diligent in his 1940 conveyance to Fechner
of Lots 32 and 33 to specifically identify there was a lot numbering error in the highway map and
to convey the lots to Fechner according to the subdivision plat.
No evidence in the record suggests Boothe, or the other original persons who joined him
in platting the property, was the source of the lot numbering discrepancy. The only source of the
error in the record is the reference to the highway map with incorrect lot numbers, and a reference
in one of Kindler’s surveys that another surveyor, William Ashley, had used wrong lot numbers
on a survey. Neither of these facts remotely suggest the Boothes contributed to these errors.
Regarding the trial court’s conclusion that Boothe’s deed to Oliver and Beverly was
reparative and intended to grant the Delavans an additional 100’ feet of lake frontage to reflect
their title ownership, there is no evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the Boothes
intended to provide Oliver and Beverly with 100’ feet of water frontage. At trial, Russell agreed
in cross examination that Oliver and Edna intended to acquire 400 feet of property from Wasmer.2

As noted in the opening brief, the width of the lots along the shore are measured parallel form the north boundary
and south boundary for a total width of 100 feet. They are not measured along the meander of the shore line. This is
best illustrated in Trial Exhibit 21.
2
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Tr Vol. II, p. 376, L. 24 – p. 380, L. 3. Russell testified Oliver and Edna had a title issue with
Wasmer if their conveyance deed description was flawed. Id. Russell indicated he could not
speculate why the Boothes granted the parcel north of Lot 19 to Oliver and Edna, including
whether there was a threat of a lawsuit, whether it was a neighborly gesture, or what compelled
the Boothes to grant the unplatted parcel to the Boothes. Id. In fact, it is unknow if Oliver and
Edna purchased the area from the Boothes.
Given the evidence in the record that John Boothe was aware of the lot numbering
discrepancy, it is significant that nine years later, when the Boothes granted Oliver and Edna a
parcel of property, the Boothes specifically used a metes and bounds description that did not
replicate the dimensions of Lot 19 as platted. In fact, the Boothes confined the grant it to an area
south of the existing county road, thereby retaining to themselves everything north of the existing
county road. The reasonable inference from this fact is that the Boothes thought this monument
was a logical boundary location. It was not based upon providing a certain amount of front footage.
Had the Boothes had such an intent, John Boothe was sophisticated enough to have specifically
called out the amount of water frontage included in the deed.
Despite a lack of evidence, the district court inferred in Finding No. 7 that the Boothes
intended to grant to Oliver and Edna 100’ feet of lake frontage to reflect their title ownership. ARpp. 1-6, Finding No. 7. The district court used this inference to support its Conclusion of Law No.
6 that based upon a preponderance of the evidence it received that the Boothes intended to grant
the Delavans 100’ feet of lake frontage to reflect what they would have received had their title
from Wasmer not had issues. Id. This conclusion of law is not supported by a preponderance of
the evidence. There is no evidence on what motivated the Boothes to convey property to Oliver
and Edna in 1949. At best, there is conjecture, all of which might be correct or might be wrong.
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C.

The district court erred in finding there was no boundary agreement

In response to the arguments raised by the District, Gregory and Ellen contend Jack was
the only witness with personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances existing between 1949
and 1956, all of which indicate the use of the boat ramp area was permissive. Gregory and Ellen
then provide the hearsay testimony of Jack regarding Oliver’s intent in building the fence. The
District extensively addressed in its opening brief why the trial court should not have allowed, nor
considered, this hearsay evidence.
In its reply, Gregory and Ellen note that the trial court overruled the district’s hearsay
objection because the District had not preserved them at the time of deposition. In a footnote,
Gregory and Ellen hedge their bets by claiming there is independent evidence that supports Jack’s
hearsay statements. It is likely that Gregory and Ellen include this footnote because they are aware
that the District did preserve its objections to hearsay statements by Jack at deposition. At Jack’s
deposition, the following record was made:
Q.

Did your dad ever indicate to you at any time after the boat launch
was put in whether or not he believed the boat launch to be on his
property as opposed to the highway district's property?
MS. WEEKS: Object to the form of the question.
BY MR. MAGNUSON:
Q.
You can answer that. If you need me to -A.
Yes.
Q,
What did your dad indicate in that regard?
MS. WEEKS: Can I have an objection to these series so I don't have to keep
interrupting you, when you're asking him about what his dad said, or do you
want me to object to each one?
MR. MAGNUSON: Okay.
MS. WEEKS: The objection being hearsay.
MR. MAGNUSON : Okay. You would object to the -- you would have an
ongoing objection to what his father and he discussed on the basis of
hearsay?
MS. WEEKS: Yes.
MR. MAGNUSON: Okay. That will be fine. We will note that that is an
objection that will continue, and you don't need restate it.
MS. WEEKS: Thank you.
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AR-14, J. Delavan Dep. Tr. p. 24, L. 9 – p. 25, L. 3.
Relying upon Jack’s hearsay statements, and relying upon the holding of Cox v. Clanton,
137 Idaho 492, 50 P.3d 987 (2002), Gregory and Ellen argue the implication of an agreement to
fix a boundary does not apply where there is “evidence regarding who built the fence” and “why
they built it”. Absent the hearsay statements which the district court improperly allowed into
evidence, there is only evidence regarding who built the fence, but not why it was built. Thus, the
implication remains that it was built to fix a boundary.
Gregory and Ellen argue at length that the Kootenai County assessor’s confusion regarding
the locations of lots as platted as opposed to the lots as deeded in the Lakeshore Addition to
Sunnyside subdivision plays a role in determining whether there was a boundary by agreement
made between the District and Oliver and Edna in 1956. The tax assessor evidence relied upon by
Gregory and Ellen confirms there was mass confusion at the Kootenai County assessor’s office
regarding the locations of platted lots because the assessor did not realize there had been a metes
and bounds quit claim deed from the Boothes to Oliver and Edna in 1949, and incorrect lot numbers
were used in certain conveyance deeds, which led the assessor to use incorrect numbers in certain
of its assessments and map depictions.
However, the county assessor’s misunderstanding did not affect whether the District and
Oliver and Edna reached a boundary agreement in 1956. The only relevant evidence from the
assessor’s records was a “Memo to File” dated June 24, 1992, indicated the frontage and acreage
assessment for Jack was amended at Jack’s request. Tr Vol. I, p. 200, L. 11 p. 204, L. 12; Exhibit
18 (page 57 of 583). In the survey information, this memo indicated the assessor received an
unrecorded survey from Jim Meckel with Meckel Engineering, who was working with Jack,
depicting the boundary between the parcel owned by Jack Delavan and the park parcel. Id. The
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memorandum documented: “Jim Meckel provided survey information and included a note as to
the boundary by agreement between Kootenai County and Delavan Sr.; said boundary being the
same as shown on prior surveys.” Id. This document also indicated: “Mr. Delavan was contacted
by phone 6-22-92, at which time Jack Delavan stated to his knowledge the agreement between his
father and the County (as to the boundary between the properties) was verbal only, and that he had
no supporting documentation other than the Meckel survey.” Id.
Gregory and Ellen also suggest this Court should reject other statements made by Gregory
regarding the boundary by agreement because they were made to acquire bank financing, and he
did not want any contested property included in the title report. There is no reason for this Court
to disregard the District’s argument on appeal because of this trial testimony. In fact, it bolsters
the District’s argument on appeal. It shows that Gregory was aware before this controversy arose
that there was a dispute regarding ownership of the property.
Gregory and Ellen also claim that this Court should give no weight to Jack’s own 1992
boundary survey plot and architect plan he submitted to the Idaho Department of Lands which
included the boundary between the park and the marina, and placed the cement boat ramp outside
the boundaries of Jack’s property. Jim Brady, an employee of the department, testified at trial. Tr
Vol. I, p. 129, Ll. 7-15. Gregory and Ellen suggest this Court can disregard this evidence because
they contend Brady testified the boat launch was situated upon the Delavan’s property based upon
Trial Exhibit 17.3 In point of fact, Brady only testified that the cement boat ramp infringed into a

In footnote 19 of their brief, Gregory and Ellen claim that Brady’s opinion of ownership is consistent with
Kootenai County’s position regarding ownership of the ramp expressed in a 1977 encroachment permit submitted to
the Idaho Department of Lands by Kootenai County’s water ways department. This representation was not made by
the District, nor is there any evidence in the record that the District was aware that Kootenai County made this
application, or joined in this application.
3

21

required 25 foot setback based upon what he observed depicted on Trial Exhibit 17, without
expressing any opinion regarding who owned the ramp, testifying as follows:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

On the next page of Exhibit 17, I would like to ask you a question. You
see the reference to the boat launch?
Yes.
And it shows it as line, I guess, north of – its got a line on the south side of
it?
Yes.
If the Delavan encroachments that were authorized or that are depicted on
Exhibit 17 don’t otherwise have a 25-foot setback, do they, unless you
include the boat launch?
The launch ramp would be infringing into the 25-foot setback, yes.

Vol. I, p. 154, L. 15 – p. 155, L. 8.
The district court disregarded the extensive evidence presented by the District of the
contemporaneous events occurring in 1956 when it contends Oliver and the District reached an
agreement. The district court characterized the survey as a wish list but indicated it did not
establish property lines. However, the survey combined with the minutes demonstrate Kindler
met with Oliver and agreements were reached. Jack’s subsequent representations regarding the
property boundaries to the Department of Lands and his statements to Kootenai County regarding
the boundary confirm Kindler’s field notes, letters and the District’s minutes that a boundary
agreement was reached in 1956. The contrary evidence to this agreement was based upon Jack’s
later inadmissible hearsay and Seale’s hearsay testimony.

Thus, the admissible evidence

established by clear and convincing evidence that a boundary agreement was reached in 1956
along the area monumented by Ray Kindler, and the trial court erred when it concluded as a matter
of law that the District failed to present clear and convincing evidence of such an agreement.
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D.

The district court erred in granting partial summary judgment on the
District’s claim that Boothe Park Road was established pursuant to
I.C. § 40-202

One of District’s claims was that Boothe Park Road existed pursuant to the statutory
requirements of I.C. § 40-202(3) because it had been used by the public and maintained by the
District for a consecutive period of time in excess of the statutory five years. The District did not
restrict its claim to only the cement boat ramp, or that portion of Boothe Park Road lying easterly
of the Oliver and Edna’s driveway. The district court granted partial summary judgment only with
respect to the cement boat ramp.
As discussed previously in this brief and extensively in the District’s opening brief, there
was not substantial and competent evidence to support the claim that use of the boat launch area
arose through Oliver’s permission.

The only evidence of such permission was through

inadmissible hearsay testimony introduced through Jack Delavan and Pat Seale, which hearsay
testimony is challenged on appeal. Absent admission of this impermissible hearsay testimony,
there is no evidence that Oliver granted the District permission to use the area where the cement
boat ramp was installed. Given the lack of substantial and competent evidence of the permissive
use, it was error for the district court to grant summary partial summary judgment that the area
where the cement boat ramp is situated was used with Oliver’s express grant of permission.
Regarding the application of Lattin v. Adams County, 149 Idaho 497, 503, 236 P.3d 1257,
1263 (2010), Greg and Ellen do not rely upon the language from Lattin that the public entity must
establish the elements of hostile use under a claim of right found in a private prescriptive easement
to meet the stator requirement of establishing public use of the road.
Instead, they claim this Court inferentially held when a property owner permissively allows
the public to access a portion of their property it does not constitute public use sufficient to invoke
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the provisions of I.C. § 40-202(3). No subsequent application of Lattin by this Court has indicated
this was the inferential holding of Lattin. However, in further review of the Lattin case, it does
appear the Lattin opinion was struggling to articulate that public use of a road under the statute
arising from acquiescence to the public’s use was different than use arising from express
permission given by the owner. Unfortunately, this Court’s discussion strayed into the concepts
of private easement presumptions and private prescriptive easement elements in its analysis. The
District strongly disagrees these elements are part of a discussion regarding the public use element
of the statute.
However, the District does not disagree with Gregory and Ellen if the Lattin opinion
intended to hold there was a distinction under the statute regarding public use in instances of
express permission as opposed to acquiescence to public use by a landowner that express
permissive use would not support a finding of acquiescence by a landowner arising to public use
under the statute. However, this concession does not change the issue raised on appeal because
the evidence of permissive use at the time the boat launch was installed in 1955 is all based on
inadmissible hearsay.
E.

The district court erred in the entry of the amended final judgment

In its final judgment, the district court decreed that “Plaintiff East Side Highway District’s
claim under I.C. § 40-202(3), as to the real property described on Exhibit A, and depicted on
Exhibit B, is dismissed with prejudice.” R p. 50. In other words, the district court found East Side
Highway District established no statutory prescriptive claim to any portion of Boothe Park Road
which traversed the property awarded to Gregory and Ellen Delavan by the quiet title decree.
The District provided ample evidence that it maintained Boothe Park Road in the area
awarded to Gregory and Delavan, that there was an existing asphalt travel surface with an adjacent
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shoulder used for road drainage, posting road signs and snow storage, and that the public used the
road, all in excess of the required stat. Tr Vol. II, p. 15, L. 25 – p. 35, L. 3; p. 55, L. 23 – p. 56, L.
20; p. 65, L. 22 – p. 66, L. 17; Trial Exhibits 51 and 52 (maintenance records), FFF (public use of
park and boat launch); JJJ (showing back of traffic sign in shoulder of road easterly of Delavans’
driveway); QQQ (showing asphalt travel surface as facing easterly, including road sign and
shoulder of road); XXX (showing asphalt travel surface and traffic signs in east portion of road).
The district court should have accounted for this shoulder in the judgment it entered.
In its final judgment, the district court decreed Gregory and Ellen’s boundary line abutted
up against the existing asphalt travel surface on that portion of the road northeasterly of Gregory
and Ellen’s driveway which led to the entry of the park area; that their boundary more or less
bisected the existing asphalt road in front of driveway accessing the property decreed to Gregory
and Ellen; and that their lot encompassed that portion of Boothe Park road westerly of their
driveway leading to the permissive cement boat ramp. R p. 53. Depicted below is the boundary
judgment legal exhibit as entered by the court with the shoulder areas of the road lying
northeasterly of the Delavan driveway highlighted in yellow; with the portion of the existing
asphalt outside of the cement boat ramp lying with Gregory and Ellen’s lot highlighted in red; the
shoulder of the road lying westerly of the Delavan driveway highlighted in green, and permissive
cement boat ramp highlighted in blue.
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Based upon the evidence presented, the district court should have granted the District a
prescriptive easement over that portion of the parcel decreed to Gregory and Ellen which
constituted the shoulders of the road eastly of the driveway (highlighted in yellow). Further, the
district court should have decreed that the district had established a public prescriptive easement
to the intersection with the driveway as there was no evidence the use of this portion of the road
was permissive and such use has existed since at least 1949 when Oliver Delavan constructed a
driveway to access the public road. The District provided records establishing it has maintained
these portions of Boothe Park Road since 1971 to the time of trial, and the public has used them
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during that time. These areas were encompassed in the District’s claim of a right pursuant to I.C.
§ 40-202(3). Gregory and Ellen to not contend this is not the case on appeal.
Instead, Gregory and Ellen claim the district court did not err in failing to decree the District
had a right in the shoulders easterly of the driveway and for the portion of road immediately
adjacent to their driveway established pursuant to I.C. § 40-202(3) because Russell acknowledged
that the road depicted in Warner’s illustrative Exhibit ZZ was harmonious with the curvature of
the road depicted on the 1910 plat. However, Russell did not testify the asphalt surface of the road
was the extent of the road right-of-way as maintained by the District. Further, Exhibit ZZ did not
depict the property boundaries consistent with the above depiction of the Court as illustrated in the
relevant portion of Exhibit ZZ provided below. The Lot boundaries as depicted by Warner in
Exhibit ZZ did not go to the edge of the asphalt pavement easterly of the driveway, nor did it
extend as far into the asphalt surface in front of the driveway as the final legal description adopted
by the district court. The exhibit except below shows this to be true:
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See Trial Exhibit ZZ.
Consistent with Exhibit ZZ, Warner prepared Trial Exhibit FFFF which supported his
“shifted lot” expert opinion and matched the illustration of Exhibit ZZ. None of the boundaries as
submitted in Exhibit FFFF matched Exhibit B submitted to the trial court for entry with the
proposed judgment.
Most importantly though, no testimony by Russell or Warner explored what portion of the
road outside the asphalt travel surface depicted by Warner in Exhibit ZZ was utilized by the District
in its maintenance of the road. This district court erred when it failed to take into account such
testimony from the District and dismissed with prejudice the District’s claim to any portion of the
right-of-way awarded to Gregory and Ellen easterly of the driveway, including the shoulders of
the road outside the paved travel way. The district court’s verdict leaves the district without the
ability to properly maintain the existing road, especially when plowing snow.
F.

Gregory and Ellen are not Entitled to a Reversal of the District Court’s
Holding that it is the Successor-in-Interest to the Coeur d’Alene Highway
District.

In Finding of Fact No. 13, the district court held, “Plaintiff is the successor in interest to
the Coeur d’Alene Highway District.” AR-3 Findings of Fact No. 13. Gregory and Ellen request
this Court reverse the trial court’s finding on appeal that the District was the successor-in-interest
to the Coeur d’Alene Highway District. However, Gregory and Ellen filed no cross-appeal seeking
this relief, and therefore may not raise the issue in the present appeal.
Idaho Appellate Rule 15(a) allows when an issue raised by a respondent does not seek
“affirmative relief…by way of reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment or order,” an
issue may be “presented by the respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4)
without filing a cross-appeal.” However, if a party seeks a change in judgment, they must file a
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cross appeal. Miller v. Board of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244, 248, 970 P.2d 512, 516 (1998). I.A.R.
15(b) sets a deadline for a cross-appeal. Gregory and Ellen did not comply with this deadline.
Gregory and Ellen claim they are excused from complying with I.A.R. 15(b) because their
issue concerns the District’s standing to pursue the complaint it filed. Pursuant to I.C. § 40-202,
as the highway district with jurisdiction over Boothe Park Road, the District certainly had standing
to bring an action for declaration of rights under the statute.
Regarding the District’s standing to pursue its boundary by agreement claim and defend
against Gregory and Ellen’s quiet title and declaratory judgment claims, in paragraph 9 of Gregory
and Ellen’s counterclaim they alleged “The Coeur d’Alene Highway District was the predecessorin-title to the Counterclaim Defendant District to this proceeding.” R. p. 24. The Counterclaim
Defendant was identified in paragraph 1 of the counterclaim as the East Side Highway District. R
p. 23. The District admitted the Coeur d’Alene Highway District was its predecessor-in-title.
Therefore, when the parties entered trial there was no dispute regarding the District’s status as the
successor-in-interest to the Coeur d’Alene Highway District.
However, at trial, Gregory and Ellen raised this issue through cross examination of John
Pankratz, the District Road Supervisor and introduction of the resolutions of Kootenai County
creating the District. See Exhibit N attached as Appendix A hereto. Gregory and Ellen are correct
there is no specific deed transferring the park property from the Coeur d’Alene Highway District
to the East Side Highway District following reorganization of the highway districts pursuant to
Idaho Code Chapter 40, Title 27. However, Pankratz testified the District maintained in its records
a copy of a recorded Kootenai County resolution which transferred all assets of the Coeur d’Alene
Highway District, including real property, to the District. Vol. I, Tr. p. 432, L. 18 – p. 437, Line
3, Trial Exhibit 49. (A copy of Trial Exhibit 49 is attached to this reply brief as Appendix B.)
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Gregory and Ellen maintain on this appeal that the East Side Highway District is not the
successor-in-interest to the Coeur d’Alene Highway District despite the resolutions reorganizing
the highway districts within Kootenai County and the resolution transferring the properties of the
reorganized highway districts to the successor operational highway districts.
This same reorganization and transfer of assets was addressed in Daugharty v. Post Falls
Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 9 P.3d 534 (2000). Therein, this Court reviewed the statutes by
which Kootenai County reorganized into four highway districts. The Court recognized under I.C.
§ 40-2727 that no highway district was dissolved until there was organized and existing a
succeeding operational unit. Id. at 734, 9 P.3d at 537. This Court also recognized under the
precedent of Independent School District No. 7. v. Barnes, 71 Idaho 203, 228 P.2d 939 (1951) that
dissolution was of little import due to the successive nature of the other districts because the newly
created district succeeded to all the rights and liabilities of the former district. Id.
The district court considered this evidence and denied a directed verdict, holding , “The
Court finds there is sufficient facts in the record by which this Court can conclude there is evidence
of an interest in the property.” Tr Vol. I, p. 444, Ll. 6-8. It reiterated this finding in its first set of
findings of fact as noted by Gregory and Ellen. As such, the issue for appeal is not a standing
issue, but instead whether the district court properly found the District possessed color of title
which conferred standing. This issue required a timely cross-appeal by Gregory and Ellen. Since
a cross-appeal was not timely filed, this Court should not consider it on appeal.
However, if this Court decides to address the color of title issue, the district court did not
err in finding the District was the successor-in-interest to the Coeur d’Alene Highway District.
Although Kootenai County’s asset transfer resolution was not a deed, given the statutory scheme
under which Kootenai County was operating at the time of the highway district reorganizations,
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and the holdings in Daugharty, supra, the resolution was adequate to create color of title in the
East Side Highway District. As such, East Side Highway District had standing to bring the
boundary by agreement claim.
As to defending against Gregory and Ellen’s quiet title claim, pursuant to Title 6, Chapter
4, the District did claim an interest in the property granted from the Boothes to the Coeur d’Alene
Highway District, and occupied the property, and were therefore a proper party defendant under
this chapter of the code. As such, it had a right to defend against Gregory and Ellen’s quiet title
counterclaim.
G.

Respondents are not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal
Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121

Gregory and Ellen request attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 claiming the District has
done nothing more than asked this Court to second-guess the district court. This Court recently
reiterated its standard related to such a request in Valiant Idaho LLC v. VP Inc., ___ Idaho ___,
___ P.3d ___ (Docket No. 44585 decision issued November 1, 2018), wherein the Court held:
"An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 is not a matter of right
to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when this Court, in its discretion, is
left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Budget Truck Sales, LLC v.
Tilley, 163 Idaho 841, 850, 419 P.3d 1139, 1148 (2018) (internal quotations and
citation omitted). "Such circumstances exist when an appellant has only asked the
appellate court to second-guess the trial court by reweighing the evidence or has
failed to show that the district court incorrectly applied well-established law."
Snider v. Arnold, 153 Idaho 641, 645-46, 289 P.3d 43, 47-48 (2012). Even so,
"[w]hen deciding whether attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. § 12-121, the
entire course of the litigation must be taken into account and if there is at least one
legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not be awarded even though the losing
party has asserted other factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation." Budget Truck Sales, 163 Idaho at 850, 419 P.3d at 1148
(quoting Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009)).
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The District has raised valid evidentiary issues in this appeal regarding evidence admitted
and considered, and has appropriately challenged the district court’s conclusions of law. It has not
merely asked this Court to second-guess the district court and re-weigh disputed evidence. Thus,
attorney fees are not warranted pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.
III.

CONCLUSION

M

Based upon the foregoing arguments, the District reinstates its request that the district
court’s verdict be reversed, and the matter be remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the
District.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of January, 2019.

JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A.

é)

Attorneys for Appellant East Side Highway District
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of January, 2018, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing instrument by iCourt upon the following:
John F. Magnuson
1250 Northwood Center Ct.
Coeur d’Alene, ID 83814

/s/ Susan P. Weeks
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